Peace Valley families are facing Christmas with the imminent threat of losing their homes to Site C & they bear the weight of bills from experts hired to protect us all from this unnecessary project. Please ease their burden by donating here.
December 22, 2017
Peace Valley families are facing Christmas with the imminent threat of losing their homes to Site C & they bear the weight of bills from experts hired to protect us all from this unnecessary project. Please ease their burden by donating here.
December 16, 2017
Premier John Horgan had an opportunity to protect British Columbians from a huge financial burden. He failed to do so. Instead, on Monday he announced that his government would complete construction of Site C.
Continuing with Site C is a bad decision on so many levels. What’s worse is how low Horgan had to stoop to try to rationalize it. He engaged in irresponsible fear-mongering, the logic of which does not stand up under scrutiny.
Horgan claims that “to cancel [Site C] would add billions to the province’s debt — putting at risk our ability to deliver housing, child care, schools and hospitals for families across B.C. And that’s a price we’re not willing to pay.”
What utter nonsense.
The cost of cancelling Site C can readily be managed without affecting the provincial budget or imposing price hikes on ratepayers. Even Horgan’s briefing notes explain that the $4-billion cost of cancelling the project and remediating the site can be written off in B.C. Hydro’s accounts over 70 years — as it should be. There would be no rate shocks, increased burden on the province’s debt or negative impact on social programs.
Horgan’s unsupported rationalization for continuing Site C rings even more hollow when compared with his government’s explanation of how readily a onetime accommodation of $3.5 billion was absorbed into the provincial accounts when Port Mann Bridge tolls were eliminated. There was no warning that this debt might crowd out the government’s ability to borrow for important social infrastructure or lead to a credit-rating downgrade. Just the opposite.
Budget 2017, released in September, states that despite “this $3.5-billion onetime shift … taxpayer-supported debt-to-GDP ratio remains relatively low.” B.C.’s debt to GDP ratio is the third lowest among provinces in Canada.
If Horgan were really concerned about the financial impact of Site C on taxpayers and ratepayers, as he says he is, he would have cancelled the project. He had all the information he needed in the report prepared by the independent regulator — the B.C. Utilities Commission. Any reading of the commission’s work confirms that, based on economics and finance, Site C should be terminated.
The commission was not convinced that B.C. needs the electricity from Site C over the time horizon forecasted, and further indicated that even if we did, there are renewable alternative-energy supplies that are less expensive and more effective than Site C.
Site C is only two years into a nine-year project. The commission determined that costs had already escalated so dramatically that the project is no longer on budget or on schedule. In Horgan’s announcement, we learn that costs have further escalated by almost $1 billion. Project costs are $10.7 billion, up from the $8.7 billion when the project was announced in 2014.
Site C’s construction schedule and budget are following in the footsteps of Muskrat Falls in Newfoundland and Labrador. A judicial inquiry has recently been established to look into that boondoggle.
British Columbians have to be aware that this decision to go forward is much more expensive than a decision to stop the project and book the losses. There will be higher hydro-rate increases in the future by continuing construction than by terminating the project today.
Despite Horgan’s rhetoric, Site C is not beyond the point of no return. Horgan will rue the day he did not stop this madness when he had the chance.
Marc Eliesen is the former president and CEO of B.C. Hydro. He was an expert intervener in the BCUC Site C inquiry, and has served in executive positions throughout the energy sector in Canada, including chairman/CEO of Ontario Hydro and chairman of Manitoba Hydro.
December 14, 2017
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December 12, 2017
After the decision to proceed with Site C was announced yesterday by the BC NDP, David Eby, BC’s Attorney General wrote a letter explaining the decision. In an nutshell, he says that the construction (sunk) costs to date, combined with the anticipated costs of remediation, would be put on the province’s books immediately, thus increasing the debt of the province so significantly that it would reduce our credit rating (thus increasing borrowing rates) and leave absolutely no money available for any other projects throughout the province.
International energy expert, Robert McCullough immediately responded, emphasizing that Eby and the BC NDP were clearly unaware that the BC Utilities Commission (BCUC) had set amortization periods for sunk costs and reclamation expenses. Their advice was that a 70-year amortization period should be used for the sunk costs of $2.1 billion and a 30-year amortization cost be assumed for the reclamation costs (which have been estimated by BC Hydro to be as low at $1 billion and by the BCUC to be possibly as high as $1.8 billion).
Following is the email from David Eby, BC’s Attorney General, explaining the rationale for the decision to continue with Site C rather than cancel it and following that you will find a link to the response from expert Robert McCullough.
From: Eby.MLA, David [mailto:David.Eby.MLA@leg.bc.ca]
Sent: Monday, December 11
Thank you for writing to me about the Site C dam.
As you know, for several years I have been a critic of the Site C dam project. The previous government’s enthusiasm for this hydro project failed to recognize the massive and disruptive changes taking place in electricity generation and distribution, proposed consuming billions in public spending for power demand that is at best uncertain, pushed ahead over the objections of at least one First Nation in the area, and shrugged at the destruction of valuable farmland in the Peace. Given that this megaproject was well underway in May, and that there was little transparency about what was going on at Site C, during the election we committed to send the Site C project for review to the BC Utilities Commission for advice on how to move forward given that the previous government had avoided any oversight to date. The Utilities Commission reported back to us, and to the public, that in their opinion terminating Site C and implementing a portfolio of alternative generation technologies would have comparable public and ratepayer costs to continuing with the Site C project.
That was very hopeful news. In response, our government took the Utilities Commission’s information to experts in finance for analysis about what options were available.
Devastatingly, at this stage we received unambiguous advice that while the net cost of the termination and continuation scenarios may be similar, the accounting treatment of the two models was dramatically different. In particular, we were told that if we abandoned the Site C project, we would incur an immediate $3-4bn public charge on either hydro ratepayers or BC taxpayers.
In contrast, we were advised that if we continued the project, even if it went significantly over budget, the accounting treatment of the completed project as an “asset” would enable it to be repaid over 70 years by ratepayers with a significantly different impact on rates and public accounts. There were two options we examined in a termination scenario: funding the termination charge through public accounts (taxpayers), or funding the termination charge through BC Hydro (ratepayers). In either scenario, the real world implications of the financial advice we received were dramatic.
For the first option, public financing of the immediate $3-4bn charge would mean $125-150m in new annual debt service charges, effective immediately on termination. This charge would eliminate spending room for promised progress on childcare and many other government and public priorities. Public financing of termination would similarly mean that billions in capital funding currently intended to be spent on hospitals, school seismic upgrading, and other critical public infrastructure like transit would be consumed entirely with no matching asset created. If we proceeded with our capital spending plans despite incurring this charge, our debt rating would change as well, bringing with it additional increased interest charges.
Leaving the $4bn charge with Hydro so ratepayers could finance it, with no matching “asset” was no better. This approach would result in an acute risk that Hydro’s debt would no longer be considered “commercial” by bond raters and/or BC’s Auditor General who has already cautioned about BC Hydro’s books which already overburdened by debt. If BC Hydro’s debt was no longer deemed commercial by analysists, this would result in BC Hydro’s entire debt being seen by bond raters and BC’s auditor general as government debt. The financial impact of that more than $10bn in debt moving on to public books overnight would be catastrophic for any hope of building the kind of province we need to build.
The decision to proceed with the Site C project taken by our government today is not a happy one. The strategies of the previous government to avoid oversight and push the project “past the point of no return” with the hope, achieved, of visiting financial ruin on the books of any government that would seek to cancel it, are unforgivable.
Thank you for writing to me about this important issue. I brought your voice to Victoria to speak against the project, and in favour of terminating. However, the costs of termination were ultimately too high for a government committed to making life better and more affordable for British Columbians. I hope that, while you may not agree with the decision, you may now understand how it was reached.
Yours truly,
David Eby
December 12, 2017
SOURCE: Peace Valley Solidarity Initiative |
December 11, 2017 19:31 ET
For more information regarding the Site C Accountability Summit please contact:
Dr. Steve Gray
778-679-9011
December 12, 2017
Calling it a “difficult decision,” the B.C. government has decided to go ahead with the controversial Site C hydroelectric dam, paving the way for work to restart.
“At the end of the day, we’ve come to a conclusion that, although Site C is not the project we would have favoured or would have started, it must be completed,” said Premier John Horgan in announcing the decision.
“This is a very, very divisive issue, and will have profound impact … for a lot of British Columbians. We have not been taking this decision lightly.”
The NDP government had been debating whether to continue the construction of the dam — which will displace farmers and submerge Indigenous lands as it floods 5,500 hectares of the Peace River valley — or cancel the work midway through the job.
Ultimately, the government concluded that cancelling the project near Fort St. John would result in a 12-per-cent increase in hydro rates in 2020. It also forecast overall rates would be nearly twice as high for 20 years beyond 2020 if it cancelled Site C — or would leave the government with significantly less money to spend on other infrastructure spending.
An estimated $2 billion has been spent so far on the dam, announced by the previous B.C. Liberal government in 2014.
The government now expects the dam, originally budgeted at $8.3 billion, will cost approximately $10 billion, with $700 million set aside in a reserve for overruns.
The B.C. Utilities Commission, the independent energy regulator, concluded in its assessment that the dam is over budget and behind its scheduled completion of 2024.
Premier John Horgan is giving the green light to continued construction on the controversial Site C dam project. (Chad Hipolito/Canadian Press)
Immediately after the decision was made, BC Hydro and the Independent Contractors and Businesses Association voiced their support for Horgan’s choice.
But the dam has been marked by deeply divisive approaches to environmental, economic, technological and Indigenous concerns that have become the front lines of political battles in B.C. — and many groups representing those factions immediately let their displeasure over the the Site C decision be known.
“Today, Site C is no longer simply a B.C. Liberal boondoggle — it has now become the B.C. NDP’s project. They are accountable to British Columbians for the impact this project will have on our future,” said Green Party leader Andrew Weaver in a statement.
“We have seen what is happening to ratepayers in Newfoundland because of Muskrat Falls, a similar project, where rates are set to almost double. I am deeply concerned that similar impacts are now in store for B.C. ratepayers.”
However, he has said his party, which holds the balance of power in B.C.’s legislature, would not attempt to force an election over the issue.
While BC Hydro has reached benefit-sharing agreements with many Indigenous groups, there are several ongoing legal challenges, and the West Moberly and Prophet First Nations have said they will seek a court injunction to halt construction and begin a civil action.
“Needless to say, we’re deeply and bitterly disappointed. It’s absolutely heartbreaking,” said Grand Chief Stewart Phillip of the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs.
Horgan acknowledged disappointment by many Indigenous people, but said his government is still committed to adopting the principles of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
“Look, there has been over 150 years of disappointment in B.C. I am not the first person to stand before you and disappoint Indigenous people,” he said.
“But I think I am the first to stood before you and say I am going to do my level best to make amends for a whole host of issues and decisions that previous governments have made to put Indigenous people in an unwinnable situation.”
December 11, 2017
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December 8, 2017
There is misinformation circulating about the cost of cancelling the Site C dam. Some people have erroneously stated that Hydro must bear the whole amount of sunk cost plus remediation immediately upon cancellation, leading to rate shock and and a downgrading of Hydro’s credit rating. FALSE. The full cost to date plus remediation is about $3 billion, which can be amortized over many years. The following has been prepared by utility finance expert Eoin Finn. The accounting rulebook states:
“When a capital project is CANCELLED such that work on asset will not be completed, costs accumulated in AuC (Asset Under Construction) accounts must be transferred to expense by journal voucher in the period it was cancelled. Supporting documentation for authorization of cancellation or correction is requested for audit purposes.”
However, as utility finance expert Eoin Finn tells us: “There are at least a couple of ways of smoothing the impact to ratepayers, which are fairly normal, GAAP-approved practice in utilities with lumpy expenditure patterns.
1. This sort of one-time “hit” IS why Hydro’s deferral accounts were created in the first place. With BCUC’s permission, the rate smoothing deferral account could be used, and the sum amortized/recovered over whatever period can be agreed upon with BCUC, which has the hammer on this. $3B over 10 years would be a $300M-a-year rate hit—which a 1-time rate increase of 6% in year 1, or successive rate increases of 2% over each of the first 3 years, would take care of. Relatively small potatoes—rates have increased 70% over the past 10 years.
2. The BC Government could eliminate or reduce either its ($300) dividend or portion of its almost $1B water charges to BC Hydro. That would be transferring the costs from ratepayers to taxpayers, but those are much the same people anyway (major exceptions are FortisBC customers in the Okanagan).”
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Further note on sunk costs to date and remediation costs:
Sunk costs are $2 Billion, including $500m for rental of Atco trailer camp, and $500m for planning at Hydro’s headquarters.
Remediation of the site is considerably less than Hydro has estimated and is between $500-800M at the most.
Vancouver’s Eoin Finn is a director of the Pacific Electricity Ratepayers Association and a retired partner of a major accounting and consulting firm.
December 8, 2017
Mr. McCullough concludes:
The bottom line is that regardless of BC Hydro’s claims, the current estimate based on BCUC findings is that cancelling Site C will save rate payers a minimum of $266 million per year or $123 per household in 2024.
There is nothing in the law or regulatory practice requiring that BC rate payers be penalized for a termination of a project that is:
It is important to recognize that part of the money spent so far was used for building infrastructure and developing resources in the Peace valley region that have a value and will be utilized.
And, this is without entering into a long term sales agreement of BC power under the Columbia River Treaty entitlement – an agreement which would generate billions of dollars to offset Site C cancellation costs and fund other BC government infrastructure projects.
To continue with Site C is fraught with problems. In 2017, there is no need to destroy our river valley’s for power, and the BCUC Final Report has clearly shown we are not “past the point of no return.”
I hope this helps towards your decision to terminate Site C which will allow us to take part in the exciting advances happening around the world.
Yours sincerely,
Ken Boon
President, Peace Valley Landowner Assoc.
SS#2, Site 12, Comp 19
Fort St. John, BC V1J 4M7
(250)262-3205
pvla@xplornet.com
Letter from Robert McCullough to Ken Boon re: Repayment of $2.1 Billion Sunk Cost and $.5 – $1.8 Billion Reclamation Cost of Site C: Dec 7 2017 Letter to Ken Boon
December 6, 2017
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